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ABSTRACT
The present study was designed to demonstrate the
possible applicability of the concepts and findings from
attitude change research to a counseling or psychotherapy
situation.

Expanding and elaborating on a study by Bergin

(1963), the effects of source credibility and setting
credibility were investigated with respect to their in
dependent and combined effects upon changes in the selfreferring attitude of masculinity following a male sub
ject's reception of communication indicating a discrepancy
between his own and the communicator's judgment.

Changes

in anxiety as a result of receiving the discrepant com
munication were also measured.
Each of 60 male college student volunteers was
assigned randomly to one of the four experimental conditions
created by combining high versus low communicator credi
bility with high versus low setting credibility.
tional 30 subjects served as a control group.

An addi

All subjects

were pre-tested on a "Self-Analysis Rating Form", the
Spielberger Anxiety Scale and the Edwards Personal
Preference Schedule.

In a subsequent interview with the

"expert", each experimental subject received communications
indicating essential agreement between himself and the
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communicator on all his self-ratings except masculinity,
for which there was a wide discrepancy.

Following the

interview, each subject again filled out the self-rating
form and the anxiety scale.

In addition, subjects were

asked to supply information concerning their reactions to
the "expert" and to the experiment.

Control subjects, who

did not have a feedback interview, also filled out the
self-rating form and anxiety scale a second time.

Changes

in self-rated masculinity and in anxiety were assessed by
analyses of covariance and follow-up procedures as deemed
relevant and appropriate.
The results indicate that changes in self-rated mas
culinity in the direction of the communicated discrepancy
were significantly greater for both the high communicator
and the high setting credibility subjects than for their
respective low communicator and low setting credibility
counterparts.
found.

No significant interaction effects were

Relatively greater changes were found for high

communicator than for high setting credibility.

When the

direction of change advocated by the discrepant communica
tion was taken into account, it was found that subjects in
both the high communicator-high setting and high communica
tor-low setting conditions tended to change regardless of
the direction advocated.

Subjects in the low communicator

low setting condition tended not to change regardless of
the direction advocated.

Subjects in the low communicator
IX

high setting condition tended to change if the direction
advocated was toward higher masculinity ratings, but not to
change if the direction advocated was toward lower mascu
linity ratings.
Smaller changes in anxiety were found in the condition
yielding the greatest mean amount of change in masculinity
ratings. >In addition, correlations between changes in
masculinity ratings and changes in anxiety, with the
direction of the change advocated taken into account, re
veal the following:

If the direction of change advocated

is toward higher masculinity ratings, there is no sig
nificant correlation between changed ratings and anxiety.
If the direction of the change advocated is toward lower
masculinity ratings, there is a significant negative
correlation between changed ratings and anxiety.

An

examination of the latter relationship suggests several
highly tentative interpretations.

First, subjects who

change their self-ratings either are not emotionally
aroused or have sufficiently worked through the discrepancy
by the time of the second testing.

Secondly, subjects who

do not change their self-ratings remain anxious when re
tested.

A continuously monitored state anxiety level would

be needed in order to shed some light on the relationships
between attitude change and emotional arousal.
Results of the study reaffirm the importance of
credibility in inducing attitude change and indicate further
that the source of the communication and the setting in
x

which it occurs, contribute independently to its credi
bility.
High levels of credibility appear to induce changes in
the belief component of an attitude while low levels or no
credibility do not.

However, a moderate level of credi

bility appears to induce change only if the advocated
change is in a direction we may assume that the subject
considers favorable.

Thus, some credibility is necessary

to induce change even when the subject regards the change
as desireable.
These conclusions, most of which are highly tentative,
have implications for both attitude change research and
clinical practice which should be followed up in several
different research studies.

xi

CHAPT ER

I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In the traditional, one-to-one counseling or psycho
therapy situation much intense, important and highly per
sonal communication takes place.

Almost all of this

communication is focussed on the behavior, the motives, or
the se1f-perceptions and self-evaluations of the client.
There are many forms of psychotherapy and counseling,
and the process of communication between therapist and
client will vary depending upon the approach taken.

For

example, a non-directive approach would emphasize the
therapist's role as facilitating the client's attempt to
arrive at his own goals.

With directive forms, much of the

communication is initiated and guided by the therapist’.
The goal of the therapeutic endeavor can be seen as either
directly leading, or indirectly facilitating the client's
development of more realistic and rewarding conceptions of
his or her self.
Therapy as defined by Frank (1973) is a form of help
giving in which a trained, socially sanctioned healer tries
to relieve a sufferer's distress by facilitating certain
changes in his feeling, attitudes and behavior through the
performance of certain activities with him.
-1-

As the "expert"
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in such matters, the therapist is expected to take the lead
in facilitating change and also to provide a socially sanc
tioned healing locale.
Conceptualized in this way, the therapy session is
similar in several respects to the process of persuasive
communication and attitude change that is ordinarily
studied in non-clinical settings.

The therapist becomes

the "who" and the client the "whom" in the familiar "whosays-what-to-whom-and-with-what-effect" formula offered by
social psychology.

The "what" element in the formula is

some specific target behavior, motive or aspect of the
client's self-concept about which the therapist guides the
communication.

Here, therapy is regarded as an interper

sonal influence process, in which the therapist attempts to
influence the attitudes and behavior of the client (Strong
1968, Frank 1973).

This suggests the possible fruitfulness

of reviewing theories and research available from social
psychological studies of communication, persuasion and
attitude change, and relating this information to the
clinical area.
One of the variables that is consistently found to in
fluence the effect of persuasive communication is that of
communicator credibility.

Persuasive messages result in

more change in the intended direction, and result in change
more often, if they are seen as coming from a highly credible
rather than a less credible source (Bockner and Insko, 1962,
Aronson, Turner and Carlsmith 1963).

These authors base

-3-

such credibility on characteristics of the communicator
himself, i.e. his "expertise" or his "trustworthiness".
The question for the clinical situation becomes; Does
this communicator credibility effect mean that a highly
credible therapist will be more effective in bringing
about changes in the client than a therapist who is seen
as having low credibility?

The importance of the clinical

setting and its effect on the communication process also
deserves consideration.

Frank (1973) states that various

settings designated by society as places of healing can
arouse the patient's expectation of help.
In an experimental study by Bergin (1963), the effects
of communicator credibility were explored on a topic with
clinical implications.

The topic of communication was the

subject's self-perceived position on a masculinityfemininity continuum.

Subjects, who were presented with

persuasive communications from a high credibility source
within a high credibility setting, changed their opinions
about their own masculinity-femininity to a significantly
greater degree than did subjects presented with similar
communications from a low credibility source within a low
credibility setting.

This study indicates that social in

fluence in an experimental setting can be effective in
changing se1f-referring attitudes.

Bergin suggests that

these findings have implications for social influence in a
clinical setting as well.
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In establishing communicator credibility, Bergin
varied not only communicator variables but also setting
variables.

The implication of the setting manipulation is

that the communication gets its credibility, in part, from
the convincingness of the setting as well as that of the
communicator.

In Bergin's study, high credibility communi

cators were used only in high credibility settings and only
low credibility communicators in low credibility settings.
Because of limitations in design, the degree to which the
greater effectiveness of high credibility communication was
due to the source, or the setting, or both, cannot be de
termined.

In addition, Bergin did not get measures of

emotional reactivity that might be expected to accompany
the reception of communications disagreeing with the subject's
self-perception, or that might be expected to accompany
potential changes in a se1f-referring attitude.
The present study was designed to be both a replication
and an extention of the Bergin experiment.

The main objec

tives were to (1) provide a closer approximation to the
clinical situation, (2) separate and determine the importance
of communicator and setting credibility,

(3) and measure

emotional reactivity that may accompany attitude change.
The study was conducted in a large county mental
hospital, which would provide a test of applicability of
Bergin's experimental laboratory findings.

Communicator

and "setting" credibility were varied in a 2 x 2 factorial
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design as a means of exploring their independent and com
bined effectiveness as determinants of change in male
subjects' self-referring attitudes of masculinity.

In

addition to ratings of masculinity, measures of state
anxiety were obtained to provide data about what changes
in anxiety accompany changes in subjects' masculinity
ratings.

The use of male college students as subjects

instead of actual patients, places a restriction on the
applicability of the findings to the clinical field.

CHAPT ER

II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND STATEMENT
OF THE HYPOTHESES
Psychotherapy as Communication, and Persuasion
In many important respects counseling or psychotherapy
is a process of interpersonal influence (Frank 1973, Strong
1968).

A large amount of communication is exchanged between

the therapist and the client.

Most of this communication is

focused upon the motives, attributes, perceptions (including
self perceptions) or behavior of the client.

It is

generally understood that the therapist will not only
observe and listen to the client, but will also question,
probe, seek clarification, elaborate, interpret and suggest
possibilities for improvement or change.

Further, it is

generally understood that the client is the person in this
communication process who needs to change, whether that
change involves gaining "insight" into unconscious motives,
arriving at a redefinition of self, "modifying" his or her
behavior, or any of a number of other possibilities.

The

treatment process will vary depending upon the particular
therapy approach being utilized.
Frank (1973) has written extensively on the persuasive
aspects of psychotherapy and the process by which the
-6-
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therapist influences the patient.

He attempts to identify

shared active ingredients of interpersonal healing by look
ing for features common to many different forms.

He states

that "features common to all types of psychotherapy probably
contributes as much if not more to their effectiveness than
the characteristics that differentiate them" (Frank, 1973,
p. 23).

He considers persuasion an important factor in many

different treatment methods.
Therapists of psychoanalytic and other non-directive
types of therapy have claimed that they do not influence
the patient and that, in fact, the purpose of the thera
peutic method is to guard against such influence.

Frank

believes that such a view may underestimate the indirect
influence of the therapist's own expectations on the patient's
productions.

He claims that psychotherapists tend to approve

or discourage statements by patients that are related to
their own personality characteristics.

Subtle signs such

as reflecting feelings, nodding one's head, and ignoring
content, can influence the patient.

Murray and Jacobson

(1971) studied a non-directive therapy session of Carl
Rogers.

These authors found that they could successfully

categorize approval and disapproval on the part of the
therapist.

They also demonstrated that the patient's pro

ductions were significantly influenced by this implicit
approval/disapproval.
Fine (1971) in describing the process of analytical
therapy, makes reference to the therapist giving approval
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and disapproval using either subtle or overt methods.

Using

the concept of "reorientation" the therapist proceeds to per
suade the patient gently or forcefully that change is in his
best interest (see Strupp, 1972).

With these authors, the

emphasis is placed on outlining alternatives, and allowing
the patient to make decisions regarding them.

Direct advice

can be used but the therapist must, as a matter of priority,
encourage the patient to be self-directive.

Evocative forms

of therapy while emphasizing indirect, patient-facilitated
processes, provide a "challenge to change" implicit in the
very nature of the therapy relationship (Frank, 1973, p. 235)
Rational emotive therapy attempts to alter the patient's
irrational ideas (Ellis 1973).

This brand of therapy uses

a rapid fire, direct, active, persuasive, philosophical
methodology.

The therapist works toward making patients'

cognitions more rational.

Ellis speaks of the therapist as

one who does not hesitate to teach, persuade, or contradict
the patient in an attempt to work toward attitude change.
Kempler (1973) in describing tactics used in gestalt
forms of therapy (see Corsini, 1973) deals with persuasive
aspects.

He speaks of the skill required of the therapist

in persuading the patient to face himself or identify his
problems.

The gestalt school places a great deal of empha

sis on the patient/therapist relationship.

The therapist

when aware of a conflict in terms of his opinion versus the
patient's activities, is obliged to introduce it into the
therapy.
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The implicit aspect of therapy as a situation involving
persuasive communication can be traced to other well-known
schools of psychotherapy.

Glasser, in describing reality

therapy (1965) specifies that the therapist assumes a great
deal of overt responsibility for directing therapy.

The

direct focus and concentration on specific behavioral
issues becomes the job of the therapist.

The development

of a working plan with the assistance of the client will
depend upon the effectiveness of the communication between
the therapist and client.

Eclectic therapy as viewed by

Thorne (see Corsini, 1973) places responsibility of manage
ment decisions on the therapist.

The course that treatment

will follow depends on the level of competence of the
patient.

Direct influence techniques are used for patients

of low competence.
Interpretation as a Persuasive Communication Technique
Bergin (1963) points out that the persuasive quality of
psychological interpretations can be documented in various
clinical reports, and the effectiveness of such interpre
tations is often discussed by practioners in terms of the
therapist's expertness or authority (see E. G. Glover, 1931,
Schmideberg, 1939, Sullivan, 1954).
Interpretation is a technique used by the following
therapist types:

Freudian, Adlerian, Jungian, Sullivanian,

Transactionalist, Rational Therapist and Eclectic (Hammer
1968).

The content may differ, but all these forms of
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treatment share common features of techniques.

Hammer

described interpretation as a major and possibly the most
powerful method of producing change.

The implicit assump

tion here is that the therapist's interpretation is heeded
and acted upon by the client because the therapist's
authoritativeness makes him a persuasive communicator.
Spiesman (1959) suggests that the so-called "depth" analysis
of psychoanalytically oriented therapy involves the thera
pist's communicating to the client an interpretation that
is widely discrepant from the client's own.

When the client

sees the truth--i.e. and is persuaded of the validity--of
the therapist's interpretation, he is said to have gained
"insight".
Aspects of Psychotherapy Related to
Research in Social Psychology
To the degree that the process of psychotherapy involves
communication and persuasion, our understanding of that pro
cess should be enhanced by the application of principles and
findings from the relevant areas of social psychology.

All

research that deals with the dynamics of one to one inter
personal relationships such as attitude change, are relevant
for understanding psychotherapy (Frank 1961).

All special

instances of dyadic relationship phonomena pertinent to one
should be pertinent to the other (Frank 1961, p. 89).

The

ability to extrapolate principles from the experimental
social psychology literature would be a promising approach
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to the study of psychotherapy.

In looking at the process of

communication and attitude change, relevant areas of the
experimental social psychology literature are reviewed.
Where applicable, related clinical theory and research are
blended in an attempt to come up with a combined overall
understanding of the dimensions of attitude change relevant
to psychotherapy.
Approaches to the Concept of Attitude
Some researchers prefer to define attitudes in terms of
behavior while others prefer to define them in terms of
cognitions or affective judgments.

Hovland, Janis and

Kelley (1953) regard attitudes as behavioral tendencies
that can be characterized as generally positive or negative
with respect to a given object.

The implication of this

preference is that the presence of an attitude involves, at
least ideally, some observable overt response to an object
or class of objects.

On the other hand, Osgood and

Tannenbaum (1955) and Rosenberg (1956) regard attitudes as
internalized bases for making evaluative judgments about an
object as a member of a class.

In this regard, Rosenberg

recognizes explicitly that an attitude has both a belief
component--i.e ., the individual’s conception of what is
true or false--and a value component--the individual's con
ception of what is good or bad.

Other theorists and

researchers extend the conception of components of attitudes
even further.

Rokeach (196S) and Triandis (1971) among
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others, discuss cognitive, affective and behavioral com
ponents as separate but interdependent aspects of an
attitude.
Adding to the complexity of the concept of attitude,
Katz (I960) suggests that we cannot understand an attitude
of a given individual, or the most effective way to change
it, unless we understand the function it serves.
identifies four such functions.

Katz

These are the "adjustment"

or "economic" function, the ego-defensive function, the
value-expressive function and the knowledge function.

The

"adjustment" function is instrumental in adaptation and
goal attainment.

The ego defensive function, using a

depth psychology approach, has attitudes serving the same
purpose as defense mechanisms.

The value expressive func

tion, using a phenomenological or existential approach,
emphasizes the individual's own self-understanding and
self-assertion.

The knowledge function aids in simplifying

and organizing information.
Conceptual Approaches to Attitude Change
The various analyses of the nature of attitude dovetail
with, and in fact often originated as approaches to the
problem of attitude change.

Triandis (1971) for example,

proposes that changing the behavioral manifestation of an
attitude begins with effecting a change in the cognitive
component which "re-directs" the affective component which,
due to its motivational character, energizes the individual
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to behave.

This investigator has found that a change in one

component of an attitude does not automatically lead to
changes in the others.

The cognitive component is easiest

to change, the affective component is next easiest and the
behavioral component is most difficult to change.
Rosenberg's (1956) approach to attitude change is derived directly from his conviction that attitudes have both
a belief and a value component.

He proposes that an atti

tude will be stable as long as the belief (or cognitive)
and value (or affective) components are consistent with one
another.

However, if these two components are inconsistent

or contradictory, the attitude will be unstable and liable
to change.

An effective way of bringing about attitude

change is to first make the attitude unstable by inducing
a change in either the cognitive or affective component.
He suggests further that a communicator attempting to
change the belief component should begin by establishing
his expertise or authoritativeness and that a communicator
attempting to change the value component should begin by
establishing his co-orientation or value agreement with the
recipient.

If the communicator is successful in changing

one component of an attitude, a corresponding change in
the other component can be expected to follow.
McGuire (1969) attempted to capture some of the com
plexity of the attitude change process by postulating
several stages as dependent variables related to the
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subject's response to a persuasive message.

These stages

are attention, comprehension, yielding, retention and action.
These dependent variables are affected by circumstances
directly related to the delivering of the message, i.e. the
source, the setting, and the communication content.

An

additional independent variable is the influence of various
audience or "receiver" variables, e.g. differences in persuasibility.

The various response stages may be affected in

different ways by the different independent variables,
yielding an almost impossibly complex pattern of possible
direct effects and interactions.

As McGuire puts it,

"...if we are trying to describe a pretzel-shaped reality,
we must be permitted to use pretzel-shaped hypotheses"
(1969, p. 205).
Kelman's (1963) analysis of attitudes brings into focus
three components of the attitude change process.

First is

compliance, then identification, and lastly internalization.
There are different approaches that can be taken to facili
tate this developmental process.

Kelman states that power

is influential with compliance, attractiveness is best with
identification, and competence is most effective with
internalization.
Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance deals
with cognitive elements and their consistency.

When two

elements are discrepant or dissonant, there is a striving
on the part of the individual to reduce this dissonance.
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Dissonance reduction can take many forms, but the general
principle maintains that the individual will move toward
the consistency of cognitive elements.

New cognitive ele

ments are retained or rejected based on the internal process
of working through the discrepant cognitions.
Within the realm of attitude change, the individual
maintains a consistent balance of attitudes.

If the indi

vidual recognizes a discrepant element as, for example,
when he receives a counterattitudinal persuasive message,
dissonance is created.

The individual will be motivated

to reduce the dissonance and move toward a consistency of
cognitive elements by either accepting the new attitude or
rejecting it and discounting its applicability.
Frank (1973), writing within a clinical framework,
maintains that internal conflicts lead to feelings of in
security, distress, and the individual will expend energy
to maintain internal consistency of his assumptive world.
Much of psychotherapy can be viewed as an effort to help
the patient resolve such conflicts.
A person can be expected to check the validity of his
assumptions.

If the consequences fail to confirm the pre

diction, he can either modify his expectations or resort to
maneuvers to conceal their incorrectness.

Attitudes and

values then become validated and modified through interac
tion with others.
The major aim of therapy is to confront the patient
with discrepancies between his preconceptions of reality,
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and work toward correcting the attitudes causing difficulty
for the patient.

Therapy affects cognitive, emotional,

and behavioral aspects of these attitudes.

The awareness

of this discrepancy creates a powerful incentive for the
patient to change, particularly in the direction advocated
by the therapist (Frank, 1973, p. 326).
An individual's assumptive world creates a predictable
universe, and anything that casts doubt on any part of it
is a threat to personal security.

An experience that is in

consistent with a person's expectations can arouse feelings
of surprise and fear.

The emotional impact would be related

to the amount of change required and the importance of the
attitude to the person's security (Frank, 1973, p. 38).
Communicator Credibility and Attitude Change
While it is clear that social psychologists recognize
the complexity of attitudes and the process of attitude
change, most of the empirical work in communication and
persuasion has dealt only with changes in the cognitive
aspect of attitudes.

Such changes have been studied in re

lation to a wide variety of antecedant conditions as well
as personality variables that are assumed to make a given
subject more or less susceptable to persuasion.

Extensive

reviews of the many factors that may be expected to in
fluence attitude change have been published (see, e.g.
McGuire, 1969), and reveal that different studies of a
given variab1e--for example, the primacy-recency effect or
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the use of fear-arousing appeals--often produce contra
dictory and sometimes confusing results.

However, one

variable that has clearly and consistently been found to
affect attitude change is that of communicator credibility.
Despite various approaches that have been taken to
develop source credibility, there is strong agreement that
the credibility of the source has a profound effect upon
changing a person's attitudes.

A positive relationship

has been found between the credibility of the communicator
and the extent of opinion change (Haiman, 1949; Hovland and
Weiss, 1952; Kelman and Hovland, 1953).

Clinically related

studies have also demonstrated this relationship (Bergin,
1962; Browning, 1966, Strong and Schmidt, 1970).
Numerous studies have been carried out to determine
the dimensions of source credibility that are most con
ducive to effecting attitude change.

Studies dealing with

the explicit concern of communicator credibility and label
ing it so, have yielded the dimensions of expertise and
trustworthiness as the primary determinants of source
credibility (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953).

These

authors divide the credibility dimension in terms of (1)
the extent to which the communicator is the source of valid
assertions (expertise), and (2) the confidence that the
communicator will share these assertions (trustworthiness).
McCroskey (1967) using a factor analytic approach
found similar dimensions, but defined expertise as

-18-

authoritativeness and trustworthiness as character.

He

found that authoritativeness (expertise) accounted for
47 per cent of the variance and that character (trust
worthiness) accounted for 29 per cent.

The majority of

studies have found these two primary dimensions of com
municator credibility--expertise and trustworthiness-although they may be given different names.
Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory has
been applied to the study of communicator credibility and
its effect in bringing about dissonance reduction.

The

major finding from this body of research is that when
source credibility is invulnerable to refutation, the only
alternative is to yield to the persuasive communication
(Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963).
McGuire (1969), following Katz's (1960) functional
approach, maintains that the kinds of functions served by
attitudes are very important and help determine the signi
ficance of source and possible setting credibility effects
His research has yielded some interesting relationships
between the functions served by an attitude and the most
relevant aspects of the source.

If an attitude serves a

knowledge function, then competence would be the most in
fluential aspect of source credibility.

Attitudes serving

an adjustment function would be more influenced by a power
ful source.

Ego defensive attitudes would be most easily

influenced by an attractive and intimate source.

Lastly,
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value expressive attitudes would be most easily influenced
by the perceived similarity of the source.
Strong and Schmidt (1970, pp. 81-82) conceptualized
the counselor or communicator as an expert and the source
of valid assertions.

The perception of this credibility is

subdivided into (1) objective evidence of specialized
training, such as diplomas, certificates, and titles; (2)
reputation as an expert; and (3) behavioral evidence of
expertness such as rational and knowledgeable arguments
and confidence in presentation.
Frank (1973, p. 73), in tracing the historical roots
of psychotherapy, speaks about the "personal magnetism" of
the healer which often results from the therapist’s "strong
faith" in what he does.

The patient has faith in the

ideology of the healer (who provides a rationale for making
sense of the patient's illness).

This places the healer

in a position to transmit these impressive healing forces.
Setting Effects and Credibility
The environment, including all the physical aspects of
the setting in which research is conducted, has received
very little attention as an experimental variable.

By its

very nature, the setting for a study must be acknowledged
and dealt with by everyone who conducts research.

Decisions

regarding setting typically revolve around practical con
siderations such as what's available, how much will it cost,
or what's convenient, to name a few.

Rarely does setting
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receive close scrutiny as an experimental variable or as a
potential source of variance within the study.
In the area of attitude change and, specifically,
credibility dimensions, we see the setting factor often
incorporated within source credibility.

The Bergin study,

included both setting and source credibility factors, and
found significantly greater attitude change with the high
credibility condition.

The independent contribution of

each factor cannot be determined.
The importance of setting is mentioned by Frank (1973),
and several issues related to this variable are identified.
In general, the field of healing is undergoing an identity
crisis involving practitioners, methods, settings, and
persons for whom psychotherapy is believed suitable.
Specific to the setting, Frank states that the settings in
which psychotherapy or its equivalent are conducted, have
multiplied.

Community mental health centers have been added

to the traditional locales designated as places of healing
(mental hospitals, university counseling centers, and
private offices).
The therapist's image is reinforced by culturally
established symbols (clinic, hospital, private office,
licence, diploma, couch, and psychological tests).

Frank

states that aspects of the therapeutic setting itself and
the context in which therapy occurs, seem to influence the
therapy process.

Frank explores the historical roots of

setting factors and mentions the "aura" surrounding sacred
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buildings and locales, in which healing rituals were typi
cally performed.

Frank relates psychotherapeutic success

in part to the congruence between the expectation the
patient brings to treatment and what actually occurs.

The

shaping of that expectation enhances the effectiveness of
therapy.

"The combination of healer and setting, providing

temporal and special boundaries, creates a favorable con
dition for change" (Frank, p. 327).
Setting credibility appears worthy of independent con
sideration in light of its broad and currently expanding
application, and from the positive results of source credi
bility studies in which setting credibility often is
in corp orated.
Credibility and Changes in a Self-Referring Attitude
Rokeach (1968) states that an individual's self con
cept may be regarded as a set of attitudes that the person
holds with respect to different aspects of his behavior or
dimensions of his identity.

Such seIf-referring attitudes,

like other attitudes, have a cognitive component (what the
person believes to be true of himself), an

affective com

ponent (how the person feels about and reacts to an aspect
of himself), and a behavioral component (what the person's
belief and feelings about himself lead him to do).

Because

the object of the attitude in question--the person's own
self or identity--is so central and important, we might
expect the affective component to be especially prominent.
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Frank (1973) believes that internal conflicts, con
frontations and discrepancies brought about through a com
munication and interaction process, can arouse feelings.
He also specifies that the emotional impact will vary ac
cording to the amount of change required and the importance
of the attitude to the individual.

With all forms of

psychotherapy, success appears to depend in part upon the
patient being aroused emotionally.

"The role of emotional

arousal is unclear but remains a prerequisite to attitude
and behavioral change" (Frank, p. 330).
In the course of working on what he considered a more
basic problem, Bergin (1963) conducted a ground-breaking
study of the effect of communicator credibility in per
suading male subjects to change their conceptions of their
own masculinity.

Bergin hypothesized that the degree of

change in one's self-rated masculinity would be related to
the degree of discrepancy between the subject's own rating
and that provided by the communicator.

More specifically,

he hypothesized that the degree of change would be directly
related to the size of the discrepancy for a high credi
bility communicator, but inversely related to the size of
the discrepancy for a low credibility communicator.
In establishing credibility, Bergin manipulated fac
tors related to both the source of communication and the
setting in which the communication took place.

In the

high credibility condition, the source or "therapist" was
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described in advance in terras of the thoroughness and
quality of his training in personality testing and diag
nosis, his experience and competence and his favorable
reputation among his fellow professionals.

The communi

cation took place in a setting that was appropriately and
attractively furnished.

Most of the research materials

used in the study were professionally printed and sophis
ticated in format and appearance.

In the low credibility

condition, the source was described in advance in terms
of limited training and experience and questionable exper
tise.

The communication took place in a barren, poorly

lighted and minimally furnished room.

The crucial research

forms and other printed materials were makeshift and in
elegant in appearance.

Subjects first rated themselves on

several personal characteristics, including their position
on a masculinity-femininity dimension.

They were then

given tests and interviews purportedly measuring various
personality characteristics and were later given "feedback"
in the form of ratings on the same personal characteristics
for which they had provided self ratings.

The persuasive

communication was in the form of a rating that differed, in
varying degrees for different subjects from the subject's
own initial rating on the masculinity dimension.

Ratings

on all other characteristics were in close agreement with
the subject's initial ratings.

After the feedback, subjects

were given an opportunity to fill out the self-rating forms
a second time.
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Bergin found as he predicted, that larger discrepan
cies led to greater changes in subjects' masculinity
ratings with the high credibility communicator, but that
larger discrepancies led to smaller changes with the low
credibility communicator.

In every case, he found the high

credibility communicator to be more effective in inducing
change than the low credibility communicator.
Problem and Hypotheses
Although Bergin discusses his results with respect to
the possible application of the principles of persuasive
communication to clinical practice, this interest was sec
ondary.

Accordingly, his study was conducted in a labora

tory setting within a broader academic setting.

The

present study was designed to explore the effects of communi
cator credibility in a clinical setting rather than an
academic setting.

The design, while still technically a

study of communication, is an attempt to move one step
closer to a true clinical application.
Besides the shift to a clinical setting, there were
three other departures from Bergin's basic design.

First,

the degree of discrepancy between the therapist and subject
was not of interest.

A constant and rather large discrepancy

between the subject's perception of his masculinity and the
rating given by the communicator was used.

Second, by using

only high credibility sources in high credibility settings
and low credibility sources in low credibility settings,
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Bergin, because of limitations of design, confounded two
potentially independent means of establishing the credi
bility of a persuasive message.

Past research indicates

that source credibility affects the outcome of an influence
attempt.

But we do not know if setting factors contribute

appreciably to the credibility or lack of credibility of a
persuasive message.

More specifically, we do not know if

low setting credibility detracts from the persuasiveness of
a high credibility source or if high setting credibility
enhances the persuasiveness of a low credibility source.
One aim of the present study was to vary both therapist
and setting credibility as a means of exploring their
independent and combined effects.
Third, although it is widely recognized that attitudes
have an affective component, the measurement of emotional
reactivity is usually overlooked in studies of attitude
change.

Bergin's study is no exception.

However, if we

assume that many aspects of a person's self concept, i.e.,
his self-referring attitudes, are vitally important to him,
we should expect communications challenging those attitudes
to arouse a certain amount of anxiety.

We might go further

and say that the more credible Can<i less easily discounted)
the communication, and the more likely it is to result in
a changed conception of one's self, the more anxiety it will
arouse.

Sifneous (see Adler and Myerson, 1973) makes

specific reference to anxiety provoking short-term
psychotherapy.

With this psychoanalytic type approach,
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the therapist forces the patient, by means of "confronta
tion", to deal with his conflicts.

Anxiety induction

becomes a goal and prerequisite for change.
Therefore, another aim of the present study was to
explore what changes in anxiety, if any, result from the
subject's receiving communication indicating a discrepancy
between his own and a "therapist's" conception of a selfreferring attitude.

The study, following Bergin, focusses

upon high versus low masculinity as a se1f-referring
attitude of importance to most male subjects.
Hypotheses guiding the study were as follows:
1.

Subjects receiving communications indicating a

discrepancy between their own and a communicator's per
ception of their masculinity will show greater changes in
the direction of the discrepancy if the communicator is
of high rather than of low credibility.
2.

Subjects receiving communications indicating a

discrepancy between their own and a communicator's per
ception of their masculinity will show greater changes in
the direction of the discrepancy if the communication takes
place in a high credibility setting than if it takes place
in a low credibility setting.
3.

Subjects receiving communications indicating a

discrepancy between their own and a communicator's per
ception of their masculinity, independent of direction of
change advocated, will show greater increases in anxiety
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if the communicator is of high credibility than if he is
of low credibility.
4.

Subjects receiving communications indicating a

discrepancy between their own and a communicator's per
ception of their masculinity, independent of direction of
change advocated, will show greater increases in anxiety
if the communication takes place in a high credibility
setting than if it takes place in a low credibility
setting.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subj ects
The subjects for the experiment were 90 male college
students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at
Montclair State College, Montclair, New Jersey.

The in

structors in the introductory psychology course asked for
volunteers to participate in a personality assessment ex
periment that was being conducted at Essex County Hospital
Center. Volunteers were asked for their telephone numbers
and were told that they would be contacted for additional
information and an appointment.
Subjects were distributed randomly among four experi
mental conditions and a control group.

Fifteen subjects

were assigned to each of four experimental groups provided
by two levels of communicator credibility and two levels of
setting credibility.

Control subjects did not receive any

treatments, but were administered the same pre- and post
test instruments as the experimental subjects (see below).
Procedure
Initial Session with Subjects for Pre-Testing
Volunteer subjects were contacted by telephone and
were told that they would participate in an experiment
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dealing with personality assessment.

The subjects were

given directions to the hospital and an appointment time.
They were asked to go to the Psychology Department at Essex
County Hospital Center and check in with the Psychology
Department secretary.
Upon arrival at the hospital, each subject was brought
by an assistant to a small room adjacent to the secretary's
office.

The assistant told the subjects that the purpose

of the experiment was to judge their ability in assessing
their own personalities.

The following instruments were

administered to each subject:
1.

Self-analysis rating scale.

A self-analysis

rating scale consisting of seven personality dimensions
was devised by the experimenter for use in this study.
The personality dimensions were dominant-submissive,
independent-dependent, high intelligence-low intelligence,
high masculinity-low masculinity, introverted-extroverted,
trusting-suspicious, relaxed-tense (see Appendix A).
2.

The Spielberger Anxiety Scale.

The Spielberger

Anxiety Scale (1966) was used to obtain a measure of the
subject's state anxiety (see Appendix B).

This scale

has been standardized and validated and has proved to be
sensitive to fluctuations in state anxiety.
3.

The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule.

The

Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (19S3) was also
administered to all subjects.

The personality inventory
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was administered to give the subjects a task that appeared
to be relevant to the personality attributes they were
asked to rate themselves on.
After completing these three forms, the subjects were
told that the first phase of the experiment was completed,
and an appointment was made for each subject to come back
and get feedback on the results.
Preparing the Discrepant Communications
The masculinity item was selected as the dimension on
which the discrepant communication was made.

The subjects

were assumed to have special concern for their masculine
image, and therefore to have high involvement with com
munications on this topic.
The next stage of the experiment consisted of the
experimenter's scoring the self-analysis rating form and
determining the communication discrepancy for each subject.
The subject's score on the masculinity dimension was used
to establish the discrepancy.

Subjects rating themselves

five or less (high masculinity) were rated five points in
the direction of low masculinity.

Subjects rating them

selves six or more (low masculinity) were rated five points
in the direction of high masculinity.

The ratings for the

other personality dimensions were scored within one point
of the subject's own rating, and would serve to demonstrate
to the subject the close agreement between his rating and
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that produced by the evaluation.

This would leave the mas

culinity rating as the only source of discrepancy between
the communicator and the subject.
The subjects were then assigned randomly to the ex
perimental and control conditions and were contacted for
appointments.
Exposing Subjects to Different
Communicator and Setting Conditions
Upon arriving at the Psychology Department subjects
were given a one-page description of the communicator that
they would meet.

They were asked to carefully read the

description of the communicator and return it to the secre
tary before going to the assigned therapy room.

Subjects

in the high communicator credibility condition were given
the following description:
The individual you are scheduled to
see for an interview is a well-trained and
fully qualified expert in the field of per
sonality assessment.

He has completed four

years of graduate study in the field of
Clinical Psychology with a special focus
in the areas of testing, personality
assessment and diagnosis.
This person is well thought of by his
colleagues in the mental health field, and
his character can be described by such terms
as honest, openminded, objective, unselfish
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and friendly.

His qualifications are

numerous, and he can briefly be por
trayed as experienced, well informed
and an expert in the field of Clinical
Psycho logy.
Subjects in the low communicator credibility condition were
given the following description:
The individual you are scheduled to
see for an interview is a college student,
majoring in psychology.

He is assisting

with the research project in personality
assessment to gain experience and practice
with interviewing techniques.
This individual has not had much
training or experience with work of this
nature and therefore you should consider
his knowledge, opinion, reliability, and
qualifications accordingly.
Communicator credibility was manipulated solely by using the
expertise and trustworthiness dimensions contained in the
one-page description given to each subject prior to the
initial meeting.

The objective of the one-page description

was to induce an experimental set in the subject that would
serve as a bias toward the "expert".
The experimenter served as the communicator in all
treatment conditions.

The appearance and behavior
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exhibited by the communicator was standardized as much as
possible.

The communicator's dress, manner of speech, for

mat of the initial meeting and the persuasive communication
were uniform for all treatment conditions.

Within the

various setting-communicator credibility conditions the
communicator's objective was to follow the standardized
procedure and attempt to alter the subject's conception of
his masculinity.

After reading the description of the

"expert", the subject reported to the designated office.
Subjects in the high setting credibility condition
reported to an office in the Psychology Department of Essex
County Hospital Center.

The large, carpeted, air-

conditioned, well-lighted office contained comfortable
chairs, a large desk, a book case, drapes, wall decorations
and a large one-way mirror.
Subjects in the low setting credibility condition re
ported to a small room located in the basement of the
hospital.
veniences.

The room was devoid of decorations and con
There was poor lighting, high temperature,

dampness, peeling paint on the walls and a dirty floor.
Furniture included a small wooden table and two hard chairs.
Delivering the Discrepant Communication
After a formal greeting and brief acquaintance period,
the "expert" proceeded to deliver the persuasive communi
cation with the intention of altering the subject's concep
tion of his masculinity.

In each case, the communicator
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pointed out the discrepancy between the subject's rating on
the masculinity dimension and the results obtained by the
psychological evaluation.
Each persuasive communication was presented along with
the subject's original self-rating form.

The form con

tained the subject's ratings and also those obtained by the
psychological evaluation.

The ratings allegedly obtained

by the testing procedure were marked in red to help illus
trate the amount of agreement between the subject's ratings
and those produced by the evaluation.
The "expert" pointed out to the subject that the
evaluation method was in complete agreement with all but
one of the dimensions.

He stressed the wide discrepancy

with the masculinity dimension and indicated that the
evaluation procedure was highly reliable and a valid in
dicator of the personality dimensions.

To highlight the

masculinity dimension, a red asterisk was placed next to
this dimension and the communicator explained that this
indicated a statistically significant difference between
the two ratings.
The "expert" concluded the session by stating that
the subject did an excellent job in assessing his per
sonality with the exception of the masculinity dimension.
He told the subject that it was rather unusual to have such
a wide discrepancy between the subject's rating and the one
produced by the diagnostic tests.
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Post-Testing on the Self-Analysis
Rating and Anxiety Scale
The subject was then asked by the communicator to par
ticipate in a related experiment that was being conducted
by a colleague of his.

The subject was informed that the

communicator's colleague wanted to determine the stability
of the ratings on the two brief scales over a period of
time.

The "expert" escorted the subject back to the room

adjacent to the secretary's office where the experimental
assistant was located.

The assistant presented the subject

with the self-analysis rating scale and the Spielberger
Anxiety Scale.
again.

The subject was asked to fill them out

After completing the two scales, the assistant

told the subject that the experiment was over.
The Post-Experimenta1 Questionnaire
and Debriefing Procedure
A post-experimenta1 rating sheet was devised to (1)
see how convinced the subjects were of the communicator's
ability to evaluate their personalities, and (2) to ask the
subjects if they were aware of any changes made on the selfanalysis rating sheet between the first and second trials.
The subjects were also asked to write down what they
thought the experiment was about (see Appendix C).

The

questionnaire was used to determine the effectiveness of
the experimental controls and level of the subject's aware
ness of the purpose of the experiment.
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After completing this, the subject was informed by the
assistant of the true nature of the experiment.

Questions

were then asked relevant to the subject's feelings and
participation in the experiment.

Each subject was told the

deceptive nature of the evaluation procedure and that he
should disregard the persuasive communication regarding the
masculinity dimension.

The subject was asked not to re

veal the nature of the experiment to any of the other
subjects.
Control Group
A control group consisting of 30 subjects participated
in the first part of the experiment in exactly the same way
as the experimental groups.

The subjects who served in the

control condition were scheduled for appointments to obtain
the results.

When these subjects appeared at the hospital,

they were asked to go to the room adjacent to the secre
tary's office.

The experimental assistant asked the sub

jects to fill out the two brief scales again.

The subjects

were told that the experimenter wanted to determine the
stability of the ratings over a period of time.

The

assistant then informed the subjects of the true nature of
the experiment and explained that they were in the control
condition which did not receive any treatments.
The control group was run to test the stability of the
dependent measures and served as a reference group with
which to compare the various treatment groups.

The control
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group was comparable to the treatment groups in terms of
the initial phase of the experiment in which pre-treatment
measures were obtained.

The control group also had an

equivalent time lapse between pre-treatment and post
treatment measures and received a similar rationale for
the retesting as the experimental groups.
location of the testing was the same.

Also, the

The only difference

between the control and treatment groups was the absence
of the treatment condition in the control group.

C HA P T E R

IV

RESULTS
The Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Subjects' Ratings of
Communicator Competence
The post-experimental questionnaire was given to all
the experimental subjects to gain information about the
effectiveness of the experimental procedure and about sub
jects' reactions to the study.

The first consideration was

the subject's view of the competence of the "expert".

Each

subject rated the communicator on a ten-point scale with
lower ratings indicating higher competence.

Mean compe

tence ratings by the different communicator and setting
credibility conditions are presented in Table 1.
Differences among these means were assessed by means of
a two-way analysis of variance (see Table 2).

Subjects in

the "high" communicator condition produced a mean rating of
2.80 while those in the "low" communicator condition pro
duced a mean rating of 3.67.

The difference between these

means is statistically significant (F=6.44; df=1.56;
p=.014).

The mean rating of communicator competence for

subjects in the high setting credibility condition was 3.30
as opposed to a mean rating of 3.17 for subjects in the low
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Table

1

Mean Ratings of Communicator Competence
by Subjects in Different Communicator and Setting
Credibility Conditions

Communicator Credibility
Setting Credibility
High

Low

Overal1

Idigh

(n=15)
3.13

(n= 15)
3.46

(n =30)
3.30

]Low

(n= 15 )
2.46

(n=15)
3 .86

(n=30)
3.17

(Overall

(n= 30)
2.80

(n=30)
3.67

(n=60)
3. 23

Table 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance of Competence Ratings

Mean Square

F

1

0.27

0 .15

Communicator (B)

1

11.27

6.44*

Interaction (A x B)

1

4. 26

56

1 .74

Source

df

Setting (A)

!

Error
*P <

.05
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2.43
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setting credibility condition.

The difference between

these means is not statistically significant.

Nor was a

significant communicator credibility x setting credibility
interaction found.

Thus subjects in the high communicator

credibility condition rated the "expert" as appreciably
more competent than did subjects in the low communicator
credibility condition.

This rating of greater communicator

competence appears to be independent of setting effects.
It should be noted that subjects as a whole rated the
competence of the "expert" toward the competent end of the
scale with an overall mean of 3.23.

This suggests that all

subjects, including those receiving the low credibility
induction, tended to perceive the communicator as generally
competent.
Subject Awareness of Changed Ratings
A second task of the subject in filling out the postexperimental questionnaire was to indicate if any changes
were made when filling out the self-analysis questionnaire
for the second time.

The results for all the subjects re

vealed that 67 per cent of the subjects indicated that they
were aware of making changes and had in fact made one or
more changes when filling out the rating sheet for the
second time.

Only 13 per cent indicated that they were

not aware of any changes made on the second rating sheet
and did not make any changes from the first to the second
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rating.

A breakdown of the subjects into high and low

communicator groups revealed that 82 per cent of the
subjects in the high communicator groups indicated that
changes were made and actually did change one or more
ratings.

In the low communicator groups, only 18 per cent

of the subjects indicated that they were not aware of any
changes and in fact did not make any.
Of the subjects in the low communicator groups, 23 per
cent indicated masculinity as a rating that was changed
specifically, while 77 per cent did not.

The subjects in

the high communicator groups were aware that change on the
masculinity dimension had been made from the first to the
second ratings.

A large portion of the subjects (83 per

cent) were aware of making changes and did in fact change
the masculinity rating specifically.

This evidence

supports the notion that the attitude change process in
this experiment was operative at the conscious level.
Effectiveness of Experimental Manipulations
Evidence supporting the validity of the experimental
conditions was also obtained from information collected on
the post-experimenta1 questionnaire.

Subjects were asked

to write down what they thought the experiment was about.
An unbiased judge was asked to review the answers and group
them according to similarity.

He was also asked to write

a description of each category when completed.

The judge
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was able to group the responses into three categories
along with the percentage of responses in each category.
The categories were (1) an experiment dealing with per
sonality assessment (75 per cent), (2) an experiment in
which influence or opinion change was being studied (10
per cent), (3) responses that were not similar and classi
fied under such headings as responses omitted, vague,
idiosyncratic and humorous (15 per cent).

The majority of

subjects participating in the experimental groups gave
descriptions that approximated the initial rationale
given to them during the initial phase of the experiment.
The experimenter felt confident that the true nature of the
experiment remained disguised and that contamination due to
subject awareness of the experimental procedure or the in
ability to produce the desired experimental conditions was
minimal.
Experimental Results
Treatment of the Data
The masculinity self-ratings were scored in such a
way that the post-test ratings would reflect relative
changes in the direction of the discrepant communication.
If the subject's initial self-rating was in the direction
of high masculinity, his response was assigned a score of
one to five with a score of one indicating the highest
possible rating.

If his initial self-rating was in the
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direction of low masculinity, his response was also scored
from one to five with one indicating the lowest possible
rating.

Each subject's post-test self-rating was scored

from one to ten in the same scaled direction as his pre
test rating so that any post-test score larger than its
respective pre-test score would reflect a change in the
direction of the discrepant communication.
These masculinity self-ratings were analyzed by means
of a two x two analysis of covariance (Winer, 1962, pp.
587-593).

The initial pre-treatment ratings served as

the covariate and the post-treatment ratings as the variate.
The Newman-Kuels test (Winer, 1962, pp. 77-85) was used for
internal comparisons following the analysis of covariance.
In addition, the adjusted masculinity mean for each experi
mental group was compared with that for the control group
by means of the Dunnett "t" test (Winer, 1962, pp. 89-92).
The subject's tendency to change his masculinity
rating following the discrepant communication may have been
affected by the direction of the discrepancy, i.e., whether
toward a higher or a lower masculinity rating.

For this

reason, an additional set of analyses of covariance com
pared adjusted mean masculinity ratings of subjects receiv
ing discrepant communications toward higher masculinity
ratings with those of subjects receiving discrepant com
munications toward lower masculinity ratings.

These
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comparisons were made within each of the four experimental
groups.
The subject's scores on the Spielberger Anxiety Scale
were also analyzed by means of a two x two analysis of
covariance.

When appropriate, the same follow-up analyses

were performed as for the masculinity self-ratings.
Finally, the relationship between changes in masculin
ity self-ratings and change in anxiety scores were assessed
by computing Pearson r's between pre-test minus post-test
masculinity ratings and pre-test minus post-test scores on
the Spielberger Anxiety Scale.

These correlations were

computed separately for subjects receiving discrepant com
munications toward higher and toward lower masculinity
ratings.
Changes in Masculinity Ratings
Table 3 contains the pre-test, post-test, and adjusted
post-test means of masculinity ratings in different communi
cator and setting credibility conditions.

The results of

the analysis of covariance of these ratings are summarized
in Table 4.
There was a significant difference between masculinity
ratings in the high and low setting credibility conditions.
Subjects in the high credibility setting yielded signifi
cantly greater masculinity ratings (p^.01) in the
direction of the persuasive communication.

Subjects in the

high and low communicator credibility conditions also

Table

3

Pre-test, Post-test and Adjusted Post-test Means
of Masculinity Ratings in Different Communicator
and Setting Credibility Conditions

Communicator Credibility
High
Setting Credibility
High
Low

Low
Setting Cre dib i1ity
High
Low

Pre-test Mean

(n=15)
3.66

0=15)
4. 13

0=15)
4.33

0=15)
3.86

Post-test Mean

6. 73

6. 13

5.65

4.66

Adjusted Posttest Mean

6.98

6.04

5.31

4.76
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Table

4

Summary of Analysis of Covariance
of Masculinity Ratings for Subjects
in Different Communicator and Setting
Credibility Conditions

Source

df

Mean Square

F

Setting; Credibility (A)

1

9.6

8.9*

Communicator Credibility (B)

1

35.5

33. 1*

Interaction (A x B)

1

1. 1

1.03

55

Error
*p S .01

-46-

1.07
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produced significantly different masculinity ratings.

The

high communicator credibility group had significantly
(P<- 01) greater masculinity ratings in the direction of
the communication than did the low communicator credibility
group.

Figure 1 presents the adjusted mean masculinity

ratings plotted as a function of the two levels of com
municator and setting credibility.

The interaction between

setting and communicator credibility was not significant.
An examination of Figure 1 (see also Table 5)
indicates that the mean masculinity ratings for the in
dividual cells increase in a basically additive way in the
following order; low setting and low communicator credi
bility, high setting and low communicator credibility, low
setting and high communicator credibility, and high setting
and high communicator credibility.

The Newman-Kuels

analysis (see Table 5) reveals that the high setting and
high communicator credibility mean is significantly higher
( P < .05) than all other cell means.

The low setting and

high communicator mean is significantly higher than the low
setting and low communicator mean, but does not differ
significantly from the high setting and low communicator
mean.

The high setting and low communicator and the low

setting and the low communicator means do not differ
significantly from one another.

The Dunnett test indicated

that all cell means except that for the low setting and low
communicator credibility condition differ significantly

Mean Masculinity Rating
Figure 1.

Adjusted Masculinity Means for subjects
in different setting and communicator
credibility conditions.
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Table

5

Adjusted Means of Masculinity Ratings for the
Different Communicator and Setting Conditions
and the Control Condition

Communicator Credibility
High
Setting Credibility
ControiL
(n= 30)
4.02

Low
Setting Credibility

High
(n=15)

Low
(n=15)

High
(n=15)

Low
(n=15)

6.98*
*

6.04*

5.31*

4.67

Overall
F
5.31**

**p <.001
*Differs significantly from control (p^.01).
Means not underscored by the same line differ signifi
cantly (P< .05) according to the Newman-Kuels test.
(The control mean was not included in the Newman-Kuels
test. )
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(p^.01) from that of the control group (see Table 5).
The pre-test, post-test and adjusted post-test
masculinity means for subjects receiving discrepant
communications toward higher versus lower masculinity
scores are presented in Table 6.

Means for each experi

mental condition are presented separately, along with the
F-ratio resulting from the corresponding analysis of covariance.

The adjusted means for the high-to-low versus

the low-to-high discrepancy differ significantly in only
one of the four experimental groups.

This group is the

low communicator-high setting credibility condition, where
the adjusted mean is significantly higher for subjects re
ceiving discrepant communications toward higher masculinity
than for those receiving discrepant communications toward
lower masculinity (F=11.31, p^.01).
Changes in Anxiety Scores
Table 7 contains the pre-test, post-test, and adjusted
post-test means of anxiety scores in different communicator
setting credibility conditions.

The results of the analysis

of covariance of anxiety scores for subjects in the dif
ferent communicator-setting credibility conditions are
summarized in Table 8.
There were no significant differences between anxiety
scores in the high and low setting credibility groups.

The

high and low communicator credibility groups also yielded

Table

6

Mean Masculinity Self-ratings of Subjects Receiving Discrepant Communications
Toward Higher and Lower Masculinity Scores in Different
Communi cat or/Set tin g Credibility Conditions

v"

Direction of Discrepant Communication
Toward Higher Masculinity
Communicator Setting
Credibility

Pre-tes t

Post-test

Adjusted
Post-test

Toward Lower Masculinity
Pre-test

Pos ttest
0 =9)
6 .35

6.45

0.63*

4. 10

(n=10)
6.20

6.23

1.05*

4.62

11.31**

4.57

1.48*

3.78
4.20

(n=5)
6 .00

Low-Hi gh

4. 25

(n= 8)
6. 25

6 .33

4.43

0=7)
4.71

Low -Low

3.60

(n=10)
4. 70

4.99

4.40

0 =5)
4.60

Hi gh-Hi gh
High-Low

*non-significant (P> .05)
**p <.01

5.93

F

3.50

(n=6)
7.00

6.92

Adjusted
Post-test

Table

7

Pre-test, Post-test and Adjusted Post-test
Means of Anxiety Scores for Subjects in
Different Communicator and Setting
Credibility Conditions

Communicator Credibility
High
Setting Credibility

Low
Setting Credibility

High
(n=15)

Low
(n=15)

High
0=15)

Low
0=15)

Pre-test Mean

32.0

38.6

35.6

37

Post-test Mean

31.0

40.0

38. 7

37.8

Adjusted Post
test Mean

34. 2

38. 1

39. 1

37. 1

Table

8

Summary of Analysis of Covariance of Anxiety Scores
for Subjects in Different Communicator and
Setting Credibility Conditions

Source

Sum of
Squares

df

Me an
Square

F

Setting; Credibility (A)

26

1

26

0.65

Communicator Credibility (B)

86

1

86

2 .16

180

1

180

2198

55

Interaction (A x B)
Error
*p < .05
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39.96

4.5 1*
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anxiety scores which were not significantly different.
Figure 2 presents the adjusted mean anxiety scores plotted
as a function of the two levels of communicator and setting
credibility.
The interaction between the communicator and setting
credibility conditions is significant at the .05 level.

An

examination of Table 7 and Figure 2 reveals that the ad
justed post-test mean for the high setting-high
communicator condition is somewhat lower than that for
the other three conditions.

The results of the Dunnett

test (see Table 9) indicate that the overall F-ratio based
on the adjusted control and adjusted treatment means was
not statistically significant so individual comparisons
were not made.
Separate analyses of covariance were used for anxiety
scores of subjects receiving discrepant communication
toward higher versus lower masculinity ratings in each of
the four experimental conditions.

These analyses indicate

that anxiety scores were not affected by the direction of
the discrepancy.
Finally, correlations were computed between the degree
of change in masculinity ratings and the degree of change
in anxiety scores.

These correlations were computed separ

ately for subjects receiving discrepant communications
toward higher masculinity scores (n=29) and those receiving
discrepant communications toward lower masculinity scores

39

Mean Anxiety Score

38

37

36

35
High
Low

High

Low

Communicator Credibility
Figure 2.

Adjusted anxiety means for subjects in
different setting and communicator
credibility conditions.
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Table

9

Adjusted Anxiety Means for the Different
Communicator and Setting Credibility
Conditions and the Control Condition

Communicator Credibility
High
Setting Credibility
Control
(n= 30)
35. 1
*p y, .05

Low
Setting Credibility

High
(n=15)

Low
(n=15)

High
(n=15)

Low
(n=15)

34.2

38. 1

39 .1

37.1

Overall
F
1.05*
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(n=31).

A non-significant correlation was obtained for the

masculinity group (r=.315).

A significant negative cor

relation for the low masculinity group was produced
(r= -.456, p^.01).

In order to determine more precisely

what this latter negative correlation indicates, the sub
jects were divided into two groups, i.e., those changing
one point or less (n=14) and those changing two points or
more (n =14) in the direction of lower masculinity selfratings.

Mean changes in anxiety scores for these two

groups were compared.

For subjects showing little or no

change toward lowered masculinity ratings, the mean change
in anxiety score was 3.50.

For subjects showing a change

of two points or more toward lowered masculinity ratings,
the mean change in anxiety was -1.06.

While the dif

ference between these means is not statistically signifi
cant (t= 1.68 , P > .05), the comparisons indicate that the
negative correlation between changes in masculinity ratings
and change in anxiety scores is due primarily to the fact
that subjects whose masculinity ratings do not change
show increases in anxiety scores.

This finding probably

accounts for the relatively low degree of change in anxiety
scores in the high setting-high communicator condition;
because subjects in this condition were most likely to
change, they were least likely to show increases in anxiety.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Credibility and Changes in Self-Rated Masculinity
Initial analyses of the data related to changes in
subjects' self-ratings of masculinity indicate that both
communicator credibility and setting credibility affect
the persuasive impact of discrepant communications.

These

two sources of credibility influence attitude change noninteractively, with source credibility having the greater
effect.

Thus, the low communicator-low setting credibility

condition, as the least effective persuasive situation,
shows no apparent impact in terms of mean changes in mas
culinity ratings.

Changing the situation to one of low

communicator-high setting credibility increases the per
suasive impact of the discrepant communication, again in
terms of mean changes in masculinity ratings.

The high

communicator-low setting credibility condition shows yet
greater persuasive impact, with the high communicator-high
setting credibility condition showing the greatest per
suasive impact of the four conditions tested.

This

suggests that subjects completely discount discrepant
communications in what is, in effect, a "no credibility"
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situation.

Beyond this, they are inclined to attend and

respond to discrepant communications to a degree that is
roughly proportional to increments in credibility.

Further

analyses suggest a somewhat less simple and straighforward
interpretation of this process.
When we consider the direction of the change suggested
by the discrepant communication, i.e., in the direction of
higher or lower masculinity ratings, we find that subjects
in the two highest credibility conditions tend to change
regardless of the direction of change advocated.

Subjects

in the lowest, or "no credibility", condition, tend not to
change, regardless of the direction of change advocated.
Subjects in the condition of some, but not a great deal, of
credibility (low communicator-high setting) tend to change
their self-ratings if the change advocated is in the direc
tion of greater masculinity.

If we assume that changes by

male subjects in the direction of greater masculinity are
favorable or socially desireable while changes in the
direction of less masculinity are not, these findings
suggest the following:

Subjects confronted with dis

crepant communication having little or nothing to support
its credibility tend to discount the communication and to
be unaffected by it, even if the communication conveys
something the subject finds desireable or would like to
believe.

Subjects confronted with discrepant communica

tion having some credibility tend to attend and be
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affected by it if it conveys something the subject would
like to believe, but to discount it if it deals with some
thing unfavorable or undesireable.

Subjects confronted

with discrepant communications having substantial support
for its credibility tend to be affected by it, even if the
communication conveys something the subject finds undesireable or would like not to believe.
Credibility and Changes in Anxiety
The hypotheses that subjects in the high credibility
conditions would show greater increases in anxiety than
those in the low credibility conditions were not supported.
If anything, the opposite is true; the smallest mean in
crease in anxiety was found in the condition of highest
credibility, i.e., the condition of high communicator-high
setting credibility.
The hypothesis of a direct relationship between credi
bility and increases in anxiety was based on the assumption
that a subject confronted with a discrepant communication
about an important aspect of his self-concept would exper
ience an increase in anxiety, and that the more believable
and less easily discounted the communication, the greater
the anxiety.

Because communication that is less easily

discounted is more likely to result in attitude change,
this assumption implies the further assumption that changes
in se1f-referring attitudes will be related to increases
in anxiety.

In a more direct test of this latter
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assumption, differences between pre- and post-test ratings
of masculinity were correlated with differences between
pre- and post-test scores on anxiety.

These correlations

were computed separately for subjects receiving communica
tions advocating higher masculinity ratings and those re
ceiving communications advocating lower masculinity
ratings.

For subjects in the former group, there was no

correlation between degree of change and increases in
anxiety.

For the latter group, there was a significant

negative correlation between degree of change and increases
in anxiety.

In other words, for those subjects receiving

communication advocating changes in the direction of lower
masculinity ratings, the greater the change in the sug
gested direction, the less the increase in anxiety.

A

closer examination of this sub-group of subjects suggests
that subjects who change their masculinity self-ratings in
the direction of lower scores do not show increases in
anxiety while those who do not change their masculinity
ratings do show increases in anxiety.
Based on the results obtained in this study, changes
in one's conception of his own masculinity were not accom
panied by anxiety.

A methodological problem may be re

sponsible for this finding in that the anxiety test was
administered at only two points in the study.

A continu

ously monitored state of anxiety from the time the subject
first encountered the discrepancy to the time the
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post-tests were administered would have provided a better
test of the hypothesis.

If we assume that state anxiety

continuously fluctuates over time, we may have a situation
in which subjects have been made anxious (when the dis
crepancy was first introduced) and when the discrepancy is
resolved (by changing masculinity rating) the anxiety level
is reduced.
Previous writings related to the area of emotional
arousal and attitude change (Hoehn-Saric, et. al., 1968,
and Frank, 1973) have claimed that emotional arousal is a
necessary condition for attitude change to occur.

These

authors are unclear as to what process or mechanism can be
used to study the phenomenon.

With the restrictions of

two measures of anxiety and limited background data for
comparison, we can make some tentative interpretations on
the results of the current study.
Subjects receiving communication advocating lower
masculinity scores either change their self-ratings in the
suggested direction and are not anxious by the time of the
second testing, or they do not change their self-ratings
and are anxious at the time of the second testing.

One

plausible explanation of this latter finding is that some
subjects are not particularly concerned or defensive about
their masculinity while others are.

When confronted with

discrepant communications about their masculinity, the
former subjects change their ratings accordingly without
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thinking much about it or possibly having worked through
the discrepancy with a corresponding reduction of anxiety,
while the latter subjects are reacting with anxiety and
defensiveness, but do not change their masculinity ratings
Implications for Communication,
Persuasion and Attitude Change
The results of the present study reaffirm the impor
tance of the credibility of persuasive communication in
bringing about attitude change.

Source credibility and

setting credibility were found to contribute independently
to the overall persuasive impact of the message.

In this

particular study, source characteristics provided a more
influential basis for credibility than did setting
characteristics, but this may not always be the case.
Future research could be devoted to determining what con
ditions, if any, make setting credibility more influential
than source credibility in bringing about attitude change.
In any case, increments in credibility seem to be
roughly proportional to changes in attitude.

It is not

possible to determine from the present study precisely how
these increments in credibility combine.
least two possibilities.

There are at

One possibility is that incre

ments in credibility are simply summed while another
possibility is that they are averaged.

In the former

case, adding an "element" of moderate credibility to an
element of high credibility would result in an overall
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increase in the persuasive impact of the message.

In the

latter case, the same combination would result in some-probably slight--decrease in the overall persuasive impact
of the message.

This is another question of possible im

portance to our understanding of credibility and attitude
change that awaits further research.
Two suggestive, but by no means conclusive, findings
from the present study indicate that the motivational and
affective aspects of attitude change deserve more careful
consideration than they have been given in the past.
First, only a minimal degree of credibility is necessary
to persuade a subject to change the belief component of an
attitude in a direction that he considers favorable, but a
high degree of credibility is necessary to persuade him to
change in a direction he considers unfavorable.

However,

some credibility is necessary to bring about a change in
the belief component, even when the suggested change is in
a favorable direction.

Thus, the belief component of an

attitude is affected by, but by no means completely con
trolled by the affective component.

Secondly, subjects

receiving communications attempting to persuade them to
change in a direction assumed to be unfavorable, either
change and work through the discrepancy, with no elevation
of anxiety by the second testing, or they do not change
and show elevations of anxiety with the second testing.
We can conclude tentatively that subjects who change are
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either not deeply involved in the issue in question, or
have resolved it by the time of the second testing.

Those

who do not change their self-perception are personally in
volved and are reacting emotionally at the second testing.
It is often reported that subjects who are "ego-involved"
in an attitude are more resistant to change than those who
are not (see, e.g., Sherif and Sherif, 1967).

It is

assumed from this relationship that "nothing happens"
to the ego-involved subject because his attitude does not
change.

However, the present study suggests that something

does happen, i.e., the subject reacts emotionally to com
munication that disagrees with or effectively challenges an
important belief.
These tentative conclusions concerning persuasive
communication and affective reactions should be explored
further with designs that include the specification or
measurement of the subject's ego-involvement in the issue
and his perception of the favorability or unfavorability
of the change advocated.

In the present study, these

factors were not measured, but merely assumed as a possible
post hoc explanation of some unanticipated findings.
Implications for Clinical Practice
The present study was conducted in a clinical setting
in which the subject's major contact was with an individual
introduced as an "expert" in personality assessment and
diagnosis.

The topic of communication was an aspect of the

-66-

subject's self concept, or a se1f-referring attitude.

To

this degree, the influence situation approximated a thera
peutic or counseling relationship.

However, the subject

was aware that the project dealt with research, not
counseling.

He was a subject, not a client.

In addition

the subject was merely presented with an assessment of an
aspect of his self concept that differed from his own.
There was no active attempt to persuade him to change in
the direction of the discrepancy, nor any suggestion that
he should change his self-rating to match that of the
"therapist".

Given these limitations, the present study

suggests several possible applications of persuasive com
munication to clinical practice.
The results of the present study suggest that the
personal credentials of the therapist and the setting in
which he operates, may be factors to consider in the
overall therapy situation.

We can tentatively speculate

that the combined or separate dimensions of therapist and
setting credibility can be related to therapeutic outcome
Viewed within the limited framework of this study, we can
discuss the following possibilities.

A therapist may be

effective in bringing about change in an unconvincing
setting as long as his personal qualifications are sound
enough.

But we must also consider the kind of change the

therapist advocates.

If the change is in a direction we

can assume the client considers favorable, the therapist
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can be effective on the basis of limited credibility.

If

the change is in a direction we can assume to be unfavorable,
the therapist needs all the credibility he can get.
These considerations suggest that different levels of
credibility may be necessary for different therapeutic
approaches or "styles".

Perhaps effectiveness with sup

portive, non-directive

or non -con frontational approaches

to therapy is not as dependent upon therapist credibility
as upon other factors in the therapist-client relationship.
However, effectiveness with more directive or confronta
tional approaches may be highly dependent upon therapist
credibility.

Further research on this possibility would

require an actual therapy situation (or an experiment that
adequately simulated actual therapy) utilizing both credi
bility and approaches to therapy as independent variables.
The suggested implications concerning credibility and
therapist effectiveness take on added importance when we
consider the increasing use of paraprofessionals and the
variety of settings being used for mental health services.
Does a paraprofessional have the credibility, and hence
the effectiveness, of a professionally trained counselor?
Is a paraprofessional limited in the kinds of counseling
he can be expected to carry out effectively, e.g., sup
portive counseling?

Are there perhaps situations in which

the paraprofessional has more credibility than the profes
sional counselor and hence can be expected to perform more
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effectively?

Does a makeshift or unprofessional setting,

e.g., a store-front location, detract from the credibility
of the communications of the professional or paraprofessional?

These, and perhaps other questions related to

the possible implications of therapist and setting credi
bility, might be fruitfully explored through field studies
with relevant populations and environments.

Ap pendix A

Self-Analysis Rating Questionnaire
Instructions: Please rate yourself on the seven person
ality dimensions using the 10-point scales provided.
Place
a check mark in the space you feel is the most accurate des
cription of yourself on that personality dimension.
Use
the adjective description given at the extremes of each
scale to help determine your relative position on the scale.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10

DOMINANT
(assertive, aggressive competi
tive)

SUBMISSIVE
(humble, mild)

INDEPENDENT
(resourceful, makes
own decisions)

DEPENDENT
(joiner, follower
5 accomodating)

HIGH INTELLIGENCE
(bright, scholastic
ability)

LOW INTELLIGENCE
(dull, poor
scholastic ability)

HIGH MASCULINITY
(overly masculine,
concrete psysical
strength)

LOW MASCULINITY
(imaginative,
sensitive, wide
range of ideas,
ere ative)

INTROVERTED
(restrained,
timid)

EXTROVERTED
(bold, uninhib
ited)

TRUSTING
(free of jealousy,
easy to get along
wi th)

SUSPICIOUS
(self opinionated,
hard to fool)

RELAXED
(tranqui 1,
unfrustrated,
calm)

TENSE
(frustrated,
driven)

Date

Name
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Ap pe ndi x

B

Date

Name

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have
used to describe themselves are given below. Read each
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the
right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now,
that is, at this moment.
2: s
o
o<
r+ (*) a . (0
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
O
<D >-j
P 3 H S
spend too much time on any one statement but
rt O p
give the answer which seems to describe your
« rt 2
fu ej* a> e
present feelings best.
►
—*

^

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

I feel calm ................................
I feel secure ..............................
I am tense ..................................
I am regretful ..............................
I feel at ease ..............................
I am worrying overpossible misfortunes ......
I feel upset ................................
I feel rested ...............................
I feel anxious ..............................
I feel comfortable .........................
I feel self-confident .......................
I feel nervous . .............................
I am jittery ................................
I feel "high strung" ........................
I am relaxed ................................
I feel content ..............................
I am worried ................................
I feel over-excitedand "rattled" ............
I feel joyful ...............................
I feel pleasant .............................
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t— J

r+

X

o

tr*

1 2 3 4
12 3 4
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 34
1 2 3 4

Appendix

C

Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Please rate the relative competence of the counselor in his
assessment of your personality.
Indicate your response by
placing a check mark in the appropriate space on the compe
tence dimension.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
High Competence

_ _ _ _

10

_ __

Low Competence

When filling out the self-analysis questionnaire for the
second time, did you change any of the ratings?
Yes

^
No ______
(Check One)

If you did change any of the ratings, please check off the
one(s) changed.
DOMINANT - SUBMISSIVE
INDEPENDENT - DEPENDENT
HIGH INTELLIGENCE LOW INTELLIGENCE
HIGH MASCULINITY LOW MASCULINITY
INTROVERTED - EXTROVERTED
TRUSTING - SUSPICIOUS
RELAXED - TENSE
What do you think the experiment was about?

N ame

Date
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